Conflict Bargaining as a Signal to Third Parties

Within the international system, states frequently fight even when opponents have little or nothing to offer them. Yet, international relations scholars envision conflict as a means for states to acquire some amount of a desired good, and view bargaining through this lens. This paper presents a model in which war and conflict bargaining can serve as signals to potentially hostile third parties. The analysis indicates that states sometimes have incentives to bargain harder than they would otherwise, in order to conceal information from future enemies. This can lead to war, even when a peaceful settlement should be possible.

Titolo: Conflict Bargaining as a Signal to Third Parties
Autori: 
Chatagnier, John Tyson
Data di pubblicazione: 2014
Rivista: 
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS  
Abstract: Within the international system, states frequently fight even when opponents have little or nothing to offer them. Yet, international relations scholars envision conflict as a means for states to acquire some amount of a desired good, and view bargaining through this lens. This paper presents a model in which war and conflict bargaining can serve as signals to potentially hostile third parties. The analysis indicates that states sometimes have incentives to bargain harder than they would otherwise, in order to conceal information from future enemies. This can lead to war, even when a peaceful settlement should be possible.
Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/11582/206818
Appare nelle tipologie:1.1 Articolo in rivista

File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento:
http://hdl.handle.net/11582/206818
  • Citazioni
  • PubMed Central ND
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
 
 
 
Powered by IRIS-about IRIS-Utilizzo dei cookie
Logo CINECA  Copyright © 2022