The possibility (and convenience) of storing and sharing data through the cloud entails a set of concerns to data security, such as the presence of external attackers, malicious insiders, and honest-but-curious cloud providers. Cryptographic Access Control (CAC) addresses these concerns but presents practical limitations, primarily due to the computational overhead of key management. In particular, user revocation (that is, revoking a user's access to encrypted data) often requires rotating those Data Encryption Keys (DEKs) to which the revoked user lost access — lest the revoked user might have cached them for future use. Moreover, new DEKs must be distributed to remaining authorized users and data re-encrypted. In this work-in-progress paper, we explore how Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) may conceal cryptographic keys from users in CAC and improve efficiency in key management during user revocation.
Work-in-Progress: Optimizing Performance of User Revocation in Cryptographic Access Control with Trusted Execution Environments
Ditu, Ion Andy;Berlato, Stefano
;Carbone, Roberto;Ranise, Silvio
2025-01-01
Abstract
The possibility (and convenience) of storing and sharing data through the cloud entails a set of concerns to data security, such as the presence of external attackers, malicious insiders, and honest-but-curious cloud providers. Cryptographic Access Control (CAC) addresses these concerns but presents practical limitations, primarily due to the computational overhead of key management. In particular, user revocation (that is, revoking a user's access to encrypted data) often requires rotating those Data Encryption Keys (DEKs) to which the revoked user lost access — lest the revoked user might have cached them for future use. Moreover, new DEKs must be distributed to remaining authorized users and data re-encrypted. In this work-in-progress paper, we explore how Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) may conceal cryptographic keys from users in CAC and improve efficiency in key management during user revocation.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
