Electronic voting holds the potential to increase voter participation and streamline election processes, but its broad use is limited by many challenges, e.g., ensuring system security and usability. One of the most difficult threats to counter is coercion; i.e., the ability to monitor and force voters’ actions. This paper proposes a methodology to assess an e-voting system’s resistance to coercion by gathering the security properties that an e-voting solution should offer from both academia and regulation, and adapting the Microsoft STRIDE and LINDDUN threats and the OWASP Risk Rating Technologies to the e-voting scenario.
Modeling and Assessing Coercion Threats in Electronic Voting
Riccardo Longo;Majid Mollaeefar;Umberto Morelli;Chiara Spadafora
;Alessandro Tomasi;Silvio Ranise
2025-01-01
Abstract
Electronic voting holds the potential to increase voter participation and streamline election processes, but its broad use is limited by many challenges, e.g., ensuring system security and usability. One of the most difficult threats to counter is coercion; i.e., the ability to monitor and force voters’ actions. This paper proposes a methodology to assess an e-voting system’s resistance to coercion by gathering the security properties that an e-voting solution should offer from both academia and regulation, and adapting the Microsoft STRIDE and LINDDUN threats and the OWASP Risk Rating Technologies to the e-voting scenario.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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Threat_Analysis_Article___CRiSIS_2024.pdf
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